HANSARD EXTRACT
|
Prohibition of Human Cloning for Reproduction and the
Regulation of Human Embryo Research Amendment Bill 2006:
Second Reading |
| 30 November 2006 |
Mr HAYES
(Werriwa) (12.11 p.m.)—This
is not a religious debate and it is certainly not, as some would
have it, an argument between science and superstition. The debate on
the
Prohibition of Human Cloning for Reproduction
and the Regulation of Human Embryo Research Amendment Bill 2006
is based solely on ethics and the recognition of basic human values.
From the outset can I say that I firmly believe we cannot seek to
alleviate the suffering of some by creating and then destroying
another human life. This is not a concept foreign to many members of
this place, as it was central to the debate concerning two bills
before this parliament in 2002, namely the Prohibition of Human
Cloning Bill 2002 and the Research Involving Human Embryos Bill
2002.
As the matter of cloning of human embryos was
comprehensively dealt with by this parliament at that stage, which
resulted in a unanimous position of banning human cloning, I would
assert that it now falls to the proponents of this bill to
demonstrate what has changed since last time this matter was
considered by the parliament. In 2002
Senator Patterson, in summing up her position, said:
I believe strongly that it is wrong to create
human embryos solely for research. It is not morally permissible to
develop an embryo with the intent of truncating it at an early stage
for the benefit of another human being
I could not agree more. I think the then minister’s strong
statement clearly sets out the ethical position held by this
parliament four years ago. The Australian parliament rejected human
cloning. In doing so,
Australia effectively joined with 30 other nations in banning human
cloning on ethical grounds. As this was the position only four years
ago, I think we are entitled to ask: what has changed to cause us to
reconsider that decision? It seems to me that the only thing that
has changed since 2002 is the review that was provided for in this
legislation, namely, the
Lockhart
review. I am sure that, in establishing that review, it was not the
intention of the parliament to create an escape mechanism by which
it could abrogate its responsibilities for ethics to a committee.
The issues paper, circulated by the Lockhart committee in August
2005, stated:
It is not the purpose of the reviews to revisit underpinning
community debate and rationale for two Acts. Rather, the purpose is
to review the Acts in the light of any changes in scientific or
community understanding or standards since 2002, and any indications
that the provisions are no longer appropriate and/or practical in
their application.
Notwithstanding that the Prohibition of Human Cloning Bill and the
Research Involving Human Embryos Bill were supported and unanimously
passed by this parliament, we now have a bill before us which seeks
to reverse that decision.
In passing the legislation, the parliament
clearly and decisively set a course of banning the creation of human
embryos for the purpose of experimentation other than in relation to
surplus eggs in the IVF program destined for destruction. It was
within this strict regulatory regime that limited permission was
granted for research on eggs provided by women in the IVF program
which were no longer required and were destined for destruction. It
now seems that some would like to rely on this proposition: if
research on surplus IVF eggs is permissible, then why not do
research on any embryo provided that it is for the purpose of bona
fide scientific research and not implantation?
It would appear that the
Lockhart committee has relied on this qualified exemption in respect
of surplus IVF eggs to unravel the underpinning proposition of the
2002 legislation. The committee attempts to draw a distinction
between the moral status of human embryos based on how and why the
embryo was created. According to the committee, an embryo created
for the intention of reproduction is seen differently to one created
for experimentation and destruction during scientific research. In
fact the committee said:
... while it was difficult to logically define a moral difference
between embryos formed by fertilisation and those formed by nuclear
transfer or related methods, it appeared that embryos formed by
fertilisation of eggs by sperm may have a different social or
relational significance from embryos formed by nuclear transfer.
It is this distinction that forms the basis of the committee’s
recommendation to permit experimentation on any embryo provided that
it does not have a social or relationship significance. What I
struggle with is that in four years we have come from a position of
banning human embryo cloning to now considering whether to permit
scientific research and experimentation which as a consequence
permits the creation of human embryos.
The 45 recommendations made by the Lockhart
committee included allowing the creation of embryos by SCNT,
utilising female eggs and/or, in the case of hybrids, an animal egg
provided that it is not be implanted in a woman or allowed to
develop beyond 14 days. While the creation of hybrid embryos has
been removed from this bill, this has not removed the problem of
having a limited supply of embryos. That was the stated vision for
the hybrids’ inclusion in the first place. I am concerned that the
limited supply of eggs may be overcome through the creation of
markets aimed at increasing the supply and consequently creating
unwanted or unintended social consequences. The inquiry heard from
Katrina George, director of the Womens Forum, of the difficulties
faced in other countries in securing the necessary supply of human
eggs without providing women with commercial incentives. As I
understand it, some women in the UK are being offered discounts on
the IVF program should they decide to donate eggs for research. The
argument of the Womens Forum is that if egg donation is open to
commercial incentives women, and presumably women from lower
socioeconomic backgrounds, may be more likely to be exposed to
coercive practices or, at worst, exploitation.
I know that such outcomes are not intended by
those supporting the expansion of the use of cloning for medical
research, but they are something that I am certainly cognisant of.
In any event, the question remains: what has changed in four years
to warrant a reversal of the parliament’s decision to ban the
cloning of human embryos? That is exactly what an independent
scientific consulting group was engaged to assess and advise the
cabinet on. After reviewing the
Lockhart
report, Matthews Pegg concluded that little if anything had changed
that would warrant a change in the existing legislation. They were
not alone in that view of questioning the benefits of embryonic stem
cell research. Dr Nicholas Tonti-Filippini is quoted in the
parliamentary committee report as saying:
Nothing has changed scientifically to support some kind of new
argument of necessity to use SCNT embryonic stem cells. If anything,
the possibility of developing therapies involving cultured embryonic
stem cell transplant has become more remote as more has become known
about the difficulties.
Like many members in this place, I took the opportunity to meet
James
Sherley, Associate Professor of Biological Engineering at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, when he recently visited
Canberra.
If anything, this man was accusing many in the debate, including me,
of letting the scientific proponents of embryonic stem cell research
get away with not having to justify their optimism about the likely
therapeutic outcomes from this research. In an article published in
the Journal of Biomedicine and Biotechnology, Sherley argues:
In order for promised hESC-based therapies to be successful, first
hESCs must be converted into adult stem cells.
He goes on to conclude:
So, why destroy human life ... when the essential barrier to
effective cell therapies is the need for more research to understand
adult stem cells? Adult stem cells can be obtained from informed
consenting adults, and they already have examples of successful cell
therapies.
Unfortunately, as we approach this debate, very few people seem to
distinguish or, in many cases, understand the essential differences
in the various disciplines associated with stem cell research. Many
mistakenly attribute the advances in stem cell research to embryonic
stem cell development when in fact to date the most significant
developments have occurred through adult stem cell research. Adult
stem cell research has shown promise in treating a range of
conditions including Parkinson’s disease, spinal cord injury, blood
diseases and heart damage. Indeed, improvements in bone marrow
transplantation are a very real example of what is currently
available and developed through adult stem cell therapy.
Professor Alan Mackay-Sim, director of the Eskitis Institute of Cell
and Molecular Therapies at Griffith University, has strongly
advocated that adult stem cell research is an ethical alternative to
human embryo cloning. He says it is probable that such adult stem
cell lines will render therapeutic cloning irrelevant and
impractical. Similarly, considerable advances have been made in
therapies involving neonatal or umbilical cord blood stem cells, as
I understand it. To date patients suffering with various diseases
are being treated with stem cell based therapies from cord blood.
Stem cells from cord blood are laying a very strong foundation in
terms of rejuvenative medicine. Only last week it was reported in
the UK that researchers at the
University of
Newcastle had successfully grown mini livers capable of being used
to test new drugs and, in the future, providing life-saving
treatments to patients in need of liver transplants. Again, while an
important field of stem cell research, this does not cross the
ethical divide.
I appreciate the reality that there are strong
competing views between various scientific disciplines. I also
appreciate the commercial reality of attracting and retaining funds
within the respective research institutions of this nation. To some
extent, one of the grounds being relied upon to support embryonic
stem cell research is to allow
Australia to stay in a competitive position with international
research. It is argued that not to allow cloning would place this
country at a competitive disadvantage to other world players in the
quest to develop therapies for various diseases. If this is the
intention behind the bill, I wonder whether this is the ethical thin
edge of the wedge when it comes to the cloning debate.
While the position of the bill is clear, in
that human cloned cells cannot be allowed to develop beyond 14 days,
I wonder what our position would be if scientists in other parts of
the world were to report greater benefits from having an embryo
reach 28 days. Our scientists may again feel that they are being
left behind in research or are at a competitive disadvantage if they
do not follow. If we were to allow that, why would we not consider
the scientific advantage of allowing research up to the early stage
of foetal development? After all, some have already speculated about
the prospects of this development in organ replacement therapies.
Will we maintain the position that anything beyond 14 days is
unethical and therefore unacceptable, regardless of reason? If we
take this step, can we really say, ‘This far and no further,’ or
have we already crossed the ethical divide?
In passing this bill, I believe that we will
have already crossed the ethical threshold. Only four years ago this
parliament took a position based on ethical considerations to ban
human cloning of embryos, and today we are debating whether to allow
cloning, provided the embryo is destroyed within 14 days. I strongly
assert that passing this bill will compromise our position on
ethically based research.
With such a fundamental change in the 2002
position, you might expect to see some clear evidence that, without
this change, it will be to the overall disadvantage of humanity. At
least you would expect to see some evidence of significant
developments in scientific research to justify more permissive
legislation, particularly when such serious ethical issues are at
stake. But no: we are being asked to pass this bill without the
slightest indication that there is any real prospect of successful
therapies emerging. In fact, we are yet to see any reason for
optimism based on the clinical work performed on animals. Despite
this, we have people speculating on a range of therapies likely to
result from embryonic stem cell research. I agree with
Professor
Sherley’s caution in this regard. As he says, researchers:
must take care that they do not take advantage of the hopes and
fears of people who yearn so desperately for cures that they will
regretfully overlook their own moral objections.
Professor
Jack Martin, in his submission to the
Lockhart review, said:
The potential benefits of treatment of diseases with human ES cells
have been greatly exaggerated, with many of the suggested cures only
long term possibilities and some not even remotely possible.
No member in this debate is against scientific research being
undertaken for the betterment of humanity. However, it should not be
based on some lofty aims or some speculative hope but on a very
clear indication of the consequences of the research if it is to lay
any challenge to our notion of ethical standards, which was so aptly
summarised for this parliament in 2002 by
Senator
Patterson.
In delivering the 2006
Thomas Moore lecture, the noted ethicist and human rights lawyer,
Father Frank Brennan, said on the status of human embryos:
Some, including many scientists, think that an embryo should be
accorded some special “human” status only if it be created by the
union of an egg and sperm, be more than 14 days old, and be intended
by its “creators” for implantation in a womb. Others think that an
embryo should be accorded special respect from the moment of
creation regardless of means, intention or age.
I fall into the latter category, and I oppose this bill.
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